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Abstract
On the eve of the twenty-first century both the world economy and economics as a social science face important challenges, 
that call for paradigmatic changes, maybe even for new paradigms. First following the global financial and economic crisis of 
2008-9 and more recently due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we can observe different types of active state interventions and 
growing state involvement to revive economic growth and development throughout the world. This has led to a renewed 
interest in the analysis of the role of the state in economic development in general, and to a renaissance of the developmental 
state (DS) approach and development regime (DR) theories in particular. The article aims to critically review and synthetize most 
recent literature on developmental states and regimes. Based on the theoretical and practical experiences of developmental 
states over more than a half century and taking into account the new challenges of the twenty-first century we critically engage 
with the related literature and aim to structure common thinking (and debates) regarding the role of state in development. 
While we argue that the new paradigm for DS has not broken through yet in literature, we present some cornerstones around 
which consensus seems to emerge.
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Following the 2008-9 Global Financial Crisis, and even more pronounced by the 
spread of the COVID-19 pandemic since early 2020 we see the rise of state activism 
worldwide. In contrast to these renewed tendencies of state activism in the more 
advanced economies, new developmentalist experiments in the peripheries (in emerging 
and less developed countries) to promote state-led catching up started earlier, and can 
be dated to the first decade of the new Millennium. Accordingly, it goes without doubt 
that the economic and developmental role of the state has been brought back to the 
centre of political and academic debates. Simultaneously with this shift in the practice 
of economic policy-making, we can witness the renaissance of developmental state 
literature and developmental regime theory in economics. Throughout this paper we 
argue, that this new strand of literature is not the revival of the old or classic paradigm 
of developmental states (Woo-Cumings, 1999), but a new developmental state concept 
is emerging. Though we admit that the most recent literature on development states 
and regimes represents rather an eclectic group of works, and the new paradigm of 
the twenty-first century’s developmental states has not broken through yet. 
The starting point for our analysis is the argument, that by the end of the last century, 
with changes in the specific (and unique) context of the successful (North-)East-Asian 
developmental states, the fall of the classic developmental state paradigm was a systemic 
phenomenon and thus inevitable (Beeson, 2004; Haggard, 2019; Ricz, 2019; Williams, 
2014). Thus in the twenty-first century we have to go beyond the geographical and temporal 
limitations of the classic paradigm, and we have to deeper embed it in modern economic 
theories (see Evans, 2010, 2014). We also have to leave behind the ideologically overloaded 
debates (based on the antithesis and disagreement of the revisionist school1 and the 
neoliberals, backed by the international financial institutions) that have characterized the 
old developmental state approach and also its demise (Stubbs, 2009; Wade, 2018). 
Meanwhile we do not aim to build a new developmental state model that could be 
applied or emulated without limitations, as we are convinced that development 
strategies are environment-specific, and are only valid in their own context in time 
and space (Fosu, 2013a, 2013b). At the same time based on the theoretical and practical 
experiences of developmental states over more than a half century and taking into 
account the new challenges of the twenty-first century we critically engage with the 
related literature and aim to structure common thinking (and debates) regarding the 
role of state in development. We explicitly aim to uncover some differences and 
commonalities of the old and new approaches, and to draw up some guiding principles 
for the twenty-first century’s developmental state concept. We are convinced that this 
provides a fertile ground to actively get involved in the intensifying international 
debates related to developmental states in the twenty-first century. 
1 In the twentieth century the adherers of Johnson and the authors of the classic DS school were called the 
revisionists, or the revisionist school, who have extended the original Japanese DS model and applied it to 
other countries first in the East-Asian region and later also outside that region. 
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The remainder of this paper is in three main parts. After this short introduction we 
present most important characteristics of the new developmental state approach 
structured around three main points: first we clarify the new interpretation of 
developmental states, then we present the new context shaped by the new challenges 
of the twenty-first century, and finally we draw up the new analytical structure for 
developmental states. The second main part of our paper is also divided into three 
subchapters while we present the most important points, regarding which consensus 
is emerging in economic literature. Thus, we analyze the requirements for twenty-first 
century’s developmental states on the level of socio-economic alliances and political 
settlements; the level of institutionalization and policy making; and last but no least 
on the level of economic policies. The final chapter concludes. 
The New Context of Developmental States Calls for a New Approach
The need for re-thinking the analytical concept for developmental states can be 
verified on the one hand with the fall of the classic paradigm of DS, on the other hand 
with new challenges emerging in the twenty-first century and presenting new 
circumstances (possibilities and limits) for governments to formulate and realize their 
main socio-economic developmental objectives. 
To revise the classic DS concept two main ways are straightforward: first, relying 
on the synthesis of most recent theoretical results (the deductive way) and second, 
‘streamlining’ latest experiences of states or groups of states revealed as development 
success and looking at their economic policy practices (the inductive approach). The 
theoretical starting point shall be the new capability-based paradigm of development 
(Sen, 1999) embedded in theories of new development economics, but also in modern 
growth theories as well as in new political economics and the new institutional 
economic school. For some more narrow-focused theoretical underpinnings see also 
the new developmentalist approach shaped by the work of Bresser-Pereira (2011; 
2015; 2016)2. While relating to the other way to revise the DS concept, the latest 
experiences of new developmentalist experiments, the most recent experiences of 
East-Asian countries – not only in Northeast, but also or even more so in Southeast 
Asian countries, and according to some analysts also the particular development paths 
of China and India (Hua & Hu, 2015; Raquiza, 2012) might offer some lessons as well 
as the experiences of the most recent Latin American developmentalist experiments 
(Ricz, 2017; Schneider, 2015; Wylde, 2012, 2017). The experiences of some quickly 
growing Sub Saharan African economies (Clapham, 2017; Biedermann, 2016; Hope, 
2019; Ikpe, 2018, 2020; Routley, 2014) and their Northern counterparts (such as Egypt) 
have to be taken into account, whereas even the recent statist models of Turkey and 
2 The term was first by the Brazilian economist Bresser-Pereira in 2003, and caught up during the last 10-15 
years first by other Brazilian scholars, and later it also entered the international development discourse. 
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Iran, or even the non-developmental experiment of my home country, Hungary, can 
offer useful lessons (for the country case studies see the followings respectively Kutlay, 
2020; Rózsa-Szigetvári, 2019; Kornai, 2015). We mainly rely on the first option in 
this paper, and the second option is only included here in the form of reviewing recent 
DS literature summing up recent developmentalist experiments3.
We are convinced that the approaches based on theoretical results and practical 
experiences go into the same direction and combining both might prove to be fertile 
for the revision of the DS concept. In this paper however we have a much less ambitious 
objective: synthetizing most recent academic literature on developmental states we 
aim to present a common analytical structure for developmental states in the twenty-
first century and to reveal some areas, where consensus seems to emerge. 
Definitional Issues
In newspaper articles, in political statements, but also in academic publications we 
might often find references to the term developmental state without precisely defining, 
what is meant by this term, or being used implicitly as a synonym or substitute for 
active state involvement. 
The classic school of developmental state literature emerged out of the concept 
formulated by Chalmers Johnson (1982) in his book on Japan, and then applied and 
extended to other, mainly Northeast-Asian countries4. With the words of Meredith 
Woo-Cumings (1999, p. 1) the developmental state ‘is a shorthand for the seamless 
web of political, bureaucratic and moneyed influences, that structures economic life 
in capitalist Northeast-Asia’.
Developmental states have of course existed and flourished in other regions of the 
world and also before the seminal work of Johnson. In Latin America the development-
oriented (developmentalist) approach has long and extensive historical traditions and 
also the term developmental state appeared before the 1980s5, however this interpretation 
differed substantially from the Northeast-Asian developmental state model. The term 
developmental state was also often used in the twentieth century for a few European 
countries (such as Ireland, Finland or even France), for some emerging countries (such 
as India or China, but even Brazil or South Africa could be mentioned), while most 
3 Besides the above-mentioned country case studies the following volumes offer wide-ranging insights into 
pracitcal experiences (Carrol-Jarvis, 2019; Nem Singh-Ovadia, 2019; Gerőcs & Szanyi, 2019; Williams, 
2014 and Ricz-Gerőcs edited volume on The Post-crisis Developmental States: Perspectives from the Global 
Periphery [forthcoming in 2021 by Palgrave Macmillan]).
4 Besides Japan, South-Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are also mostly labelled as the classic DS. 
The main characteristics of the extended version of the classic DS model are also valid (with some limita-
tions, of course) for the second generation of the newly industrializing countries in Southeast-Asia (such as 
Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia).
5 See Cardoso and Faletto (1979, pp. 143-148) or Soares (1975) cited in Schneider (1999, p. 278).
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recently it has a new renaissance to label some quickly-growing African countries as 
developmental (for example Botswana, Rwanda or Ethiopia) 6. 
In this vein one could agree with Mark Beeson (2007:120) claiming, that “the 
developmental state has become a generic term to describe governments which try to 
‘intervene’ actively in economic processes and direct the course of development, rather 
than relying on market forces.” We could also refer to Laura Routley (2014:159), who 
argues that “the concept of a developmental state therefore often works less as a model 
and more as a ‘buzzword’ with its own uses and effects,” while Ben Fine (2013, p. 3) 
also speaks of the “buzzword character of the DSP” [developmental state paradigm]. 
We are convinced that in order to prevent the misuse and even the ‘hollowing out’ of 
the term developmental state, it is inevitable to re-define or revisit its meaning in the 
twenty-first century. 
We are convinced that the defining characteristics of the classic developmental state 
definition according to Johnson (1982, p. 23) are still valid.7 Thus, the developmental 
state refers to a capitalist, plan-rational model, with a long term commitment to the 
developmental-oriented approach, and active state interventionism in order to achieve 
main socio-economic objectives. It is also tenable that for building or maintaining a 
developmental state some kind of social consensus is needed regarding the central 
role of state in development, as well as on the content of the main socio-economic 
objectives. 
The classic developmental state paradigm has been focusing on the special case of 
the late-comers to development, and has put economic transformation and catching 
up at top of its priorities, more precisely maximizing economic growth. Due to the 
specific and unique Northeast-Asian context it was achieved in a way, that economic 
growth served the wellbeing of a wide social base, but this shared character of 
economic growth at least initially was mostly an unintended by-product and less the 
result of conscious economic policies or political intention (Jomo, 2006; World Bank, 
1993). Any developmental state theory in the twenty-first century has to go beyond 
this old approach focusing on economic growth, and under the concept of widely 
defined development, the so called human-capabilities approach (Sen, 1999). Whereas 
besides the economic dimension the new DS models also have to focus on human 
(inclusive) development (the social dimension), as well as taking into account political 
and environmental aspects, and the spatial, gender and generational issues of 
development. 
6 Routley (2012:11-12) provides a good overview on a state discussed more recently as developmental. 
7 This claim refers merely to the validity of the definition, and not the model itself, which has though enabled 
the Japanese economic miracle, but at the same time it is also at the roots of the Japanese economic struggles 
for the last quarter century (Murphy, 2014).
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The classic DS concept has analyzed the structural transformation of backward, 
mainly agrarian economies within the specific context of late-development, thus mainly 
focused on the process of industrialization. The new economic transformation dating 
back to the end of the twentieth century has led to a shift towards the knowledge and 
service sector, as being the main driving forces behind economic growth. The new, 
bifurcated service sector (Evans, 2014:229) consists of a well-paying business and 
financial subsector providing employment opportunity for a small minority of service-
sector workers, and of a low paid – underestimated and underrewarded – subsector of 
interpersonal services. This results in basically different distributional and welfare 
implications, as the industrialization did in the twentieth century. Among the most 
visible consequences are the increasing social inequalities. Against this background 
today we have to go beyond the special cases of late-development and industrialization, 
and analyze the structural transformation of economies at different stages of development 
in more general terms. 
This broader approach also implies, that the geographical focus, that once used to 
be concentrating on (North-)East-Asia, shall not be interchanged for a new Africa-
focus, but the new developmental state concept should be extended also in its 
geographical relevance to include all emerging and developing countries aiming at 
pursuing a state-led catching up process (in line with the widening of the developmental 
focus as described above). 
The immaturity of the new developmental state concept can easily be illustrated by 
the diversity of economic literature and their eclectic views. These often use different 
labels for the developmental states, emphasizing its catalyst, or enabling role, or 
describing it as a facilitator. Mariana Mazzucato (2013, p. 21) even goes further in her 
book on entrepreneurial states, deriving from experiences of more developed 
economies, mainly the United States, and argues, that a so called ‘hidden developmental 
state’8 has played an important and active role in their economic successes. In her 
argumentation the state (of the United States) has went well beyond Keynesian type 
macroeconomic interventions, or even the passive financing of research and development 
(R&D) activities, and has performed entrepreneurial activities in Schumpeterian vein, 
such as actively overtaking market risks or creating new markets. Regarding these 
views however we stick to the special case approach applied on development 
economics, namely the need to formulate different policies depending on development 
stages and levels, as the same policies that might work in an advanced country setting, 
might not work in less developed economies (see also Cornia, 2020).
Finally, we might conclude that the label developmental state is not by all means a 
favored or precisely defined one in the twenty-first century, we are convinced however, 
8 For a longer discussion on the hidden developmental state see the original article of Block (2008) or the 
review article of Szalavetz (2015).
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that re-defining the term DS and revisiting the DS concept according to past experiences 
and future challenges, might offer useful lessons for states with developmental 
aspirations in the twenty-first century. 
New Challenges in the Twenty-first Century
At the latest by the end of the twentieth century changes in the external and internal 
context of classic, East-Asian developmental states has led to the fall of the classic 
paradigm of DS (Fine et al., 2013; Williams, 2014; Woo-Cumings, 1999). At the beginning 
of the twenty-first century all the ‘to-be-developmental states’ face new challenges, that 
significantly differ from circumstances and conditions given at the time of the emergence 
of classic developmental states by the mid of the last century. In recent development 
state literature four challenges are mostly highlighted, that represent a new environment 
for developmentalist states in the early twenty-first century (Williams, 2014, p. 8–24). 
After recalling and adapting these four challenges to the most recent changes (the post-
crisis and post-Covid period), we add three further aspects which inevitably shape the 
possibilities of current governments to implement their national development projects. 
The first challenge is the new economic re-structuring, referring to the shift from 
manufacturing to the knowledge and service sectors, the so-called bit-driven or new 
economy based on knowledge and innovation. In this new economy besides the physical 
capital human capabilities, the spread of information and investments expanding these 
new factors (like education, health and legal infrastructure) play an ever larger role. 
The economy is more and more driven by knowledge, innovation as well as by business 
and financial services, and this in a stark contrast with the twentieth century and the 
dominance of manufacturing (Williams, 2014, p. 9, 10). In this ‘new economic’ setting 
beyond physical capital accumulation expanding human capabilities and the spread 
of information (like investments in education, health and the legal infrastructure) play 
an ever-larger role. Parallel to these changes, important shift also occurred in the 
organization of global production. The emergence of global value chains (GVCs) also 
poses new challenges (constraints but maybe also new opportunities) for governments 
with developmentalist aspirations (Gereffi, 2014). Even though it is less feasible not 
to participate, still questions arise on how to access, how to connect local firms to 
GVCs, and how to “persuade” GVCs to contribute to the national development project, 
and the answers are not yet trivial. Under the new external and internal circumstances 
of the twenty-first century there is a need to redefine the roles and tools of the states 
in the context of “late-late developing” countries (Gerschenkron, 1962; Hirschman, 
1968), taking into account the role of GVCs, and also by adding science, technology 
and innovation (STI) policies to the traditional policy areas.
The second challenge relates to changes in political context of the twenty-first 
century’s developmental states. Changes in domestic politics until the early 2000s 
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were thought to be moving from authoritarian regimes towards more democratic ones 
was going hand in hand (it was assumed) with the above mentioned spread of new 
information and communication technologies (Williams, 2014, pp. 12–13). By now 
we know that these presumptions proved to be illusionary, and the retreat of democracy 
(Freedom House, 2018) is the most recent dominant tendency (see also Bermeo, 2016; 
Kornai, 2016; Kurlantzick, 2016; Rodrik, 2011), which can be seen as a reversal of 
the democratization waves as foreseen by Huntington (Huntington, 1991). Without 
doubts, the emergence of a new bit-driven economy has its direct and indirect 
consequences also for the society and politics. Due to the appreciation of knowledge 
and human capabilities, a new “enlightenment” might be taking place (with involving 
many, while also leaving out other parts of the societies and leading to new tensions 
and inequalities). These tendencies provoke changes in social needs, norms, values 
and perceptions. The specific context of classic DS was determined by the late-
development, the mobilization for war, the external threat of the cold war and economic 
nationalism (and due to all these factors the societies of the classic DS were willing 
to undertake some sacrifices – such as accept repressive authoritarian regimes). In 
contrast today any “to-be-developmental state” must create and build up a new 
legitimacy base according to the new circumstances of the twenty-first century. Within 
this new political context community priorities and the developmental agenda has to 
be set up based on a new alliance between the state and society, including broader 
parts of the society (such as the labor class, which used to be repressed – or at least 
co-opted by means of economic growth – in the early DS versions). According to the 
general expectations relying on the development as freedom approach related changes 
should imply the move from authoritarian regimes towards more democratic ones. 
This latter also implies improvements in terms of the embeddedness of the political 
subsystem into the society, political freedom, participation, the involvement of the 
civic society and the collective determination of the main priorities of the community 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2019). According to Amartya Sen (1999) a democratic political 
system based on representative, deliberative political participation is not just a mean 
for achieving widely defined development but is a goal in itself. However more recent 
political changes reveal a political-ideological turn globally with the rise and spread 
of illiberal or autocratic regimes, accompanied by populist, nationalist and patriotic 
tendencies (Gerőcs & Szanyi, 2019; Mihályi & Szelényi, 2020). Recent rise of 
illiberalism has led to democratic backsliding, materializing in tendencies towards 
strengthened reliance on autocratic governance style, personalistic rules, attacks on 
checks and balances of political power and hurting independent agencies and 
institutions. While some authors tend to name these illiberal regimes as some kind of 
new developmentalist states (see e.g. Scheiring, 2020; Wilkin, 2016), we do not agree. 
According to our views the starting point for a new developmental state shall be the 
capability approach to human development, and the main lesson from the classic DS 
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experiences shall be the growth-with equity approach and the resulting inclusive 
development trajectory. Huge debates regarding the possibilities and challenges of the 
democratic developmental states (see e.g. Edigheji, 2010; Robinson & White, 1998; 
Tapscott, Halvorsen, & Cruz-Del Rosario, 2018) are not settled yet, but this question 
constitutes to be a relevant dimension for the current developmental states discussions.
Related, but formulated as the third challenge we highlight epistemic changes in 
the meaning of development and its interpretation (Williams, 2014, p. 18). The 
expansion of the meaning of development is undoubtedly moving away from the 
“economic growth-centered” thinking of the last century, towards the “development 
as freedom” interpretation, also called human-capabilities approach (Sen, 1999). Thus, 
the promotion of development cannot be equaled any more with the “technical 
problematic” of economic growth that merely requires economic knowledge, but a 
development-oriented approach has to be considered more and more as a political 
problematic, as social welfare is a function of different non-economic factors (besides 
of course economic growth), such as social justice, poverty, inequalities or social 
participation and perception. These changes are however rather representing the 
changes in development economic thinking and academic debates, than in political 
rhetoric, which is still skewed towards economic growth obsessions, while at the same 
time (at least in new populist regimes) tends to shift towards emphasizing the need to 
secure stability and security (and not necessarily promising material or non-material 
improvements such as higher income-levels or better living conditions).
The last “traditional” challenge emerging in recent literature is the ecological one: 
environmental limits, including the new challenges posed by the climate change and 
the aspects of environmental justice (Williams, 2014, p. 21). By now it is beyond any 
doubt, that the resource-intensive development path of the last century based 
predominantly on fossil-fuels cannot be maintained in the twenty-first century on a 
global level. This inherently leads to inevitable changes in existing consumption and 
production patterns and habits, while existing structures and infrastructures also have 
to be revised and altered. In the light of market failures and externalities the state has 
to play a central role in the realization of a green development path. At the same time 
according to Mazzucato’s (2013) argumentation environmental limits also offer the 
possibility for governments to revise their development strategies, and consider green 
technology developments as engines for economic growth, employment and innovation 
on the long run (and to realize an environmentally sustainable development trajectory). 
The Chinese experiences with green industrial policies might be insightful in this vein 
(see Szalavetz, forthcoming). In the light of the past experiences of developmental 
states besides the environmental sustainability greater attention to the spatial dimension 
of development, and consequently a larger focus on rural areas and the role of agrarian 
development could be verified. 
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There are many further urging pressures (either long existing, recently intensifying 
or newly emerging) that might significantly alter possibilities and the room for maneuver 
of the twenty-first century’s developmental states. In the following we focus on the three 
most pressing challenges. First, the financial globalization and the experiences and 
effects of recent financial and economic crises. Due to these the centrality of effective 
resource allocation is becoming a central issue, while the financial viability of nation-
based development interventions is deteriorating. In order to understand the logic of 
development-oriented interventions in the light of financial globalization one has to 
distinguish between productive (real) and speculative (financial) investments. While in 
the case of the former it might be a declared and accepted objective to support the 
generation of employment or the expansion of human capabilities, in the case of the 
latter state regulation might be needed not least to decrease the financial vulnerability. 
Fine and Pollen (2016) refer to this challenge as financialization (‘the extraordinary 
growth of finance’), and highlight its wide-ranging consequences, such as the influence 
of finance regarding investments, value judgements, and more broadly extending over 
economic and social policy, and as a result constraining (or at least transforming and 
conditioning) the prospects for development, or rather for developmental states to emerge.
As a second issue, we mention high and rising inequalities and its consequences both 
in terms of political consequences (rise of populism and illiberalism) and regarding the 
increased pressures towards active social policies in the short term, while on the longer 
term posing potential burdens on the economic growth potential. There is emerging 
consensus that currently real or perceived economic inequality in several countries 
approaches or surpasses the highest levels of inequality ever recorded (See e.g. Mihályi 
& Szelényi, 2019; Milanovic, 2012; Piketty, 2014). Even though there are also some 
success stories from countries that managed to decrease inequalities recently – even if 
in some cases only temporarily, such as in major Latin American countries (Cornia, 
2014; Lavinas, 2017; López-Calva & Lustig, 2010) – however these trends seem to be 
halted, and inequalities still remained at steadily high levels. High and/or increasing (real 
or perceived) levels of inequalities pose pressing challenges on governments with 
developmental aspirations, as social pressure towards redistribution increases and social 
expenditures compete for scarce state revenues (also needed to finance developmentalist 
interventions). Current governments have to take into consideration, on the one hand, 
the effects of growing inequalities both on economic performance and on political 
legitimacy, while on the other hand also how increasing inequalities and social tensions 
may affect government power and revenues (the ability to collect taxes).
Last but not least we cannot leave out the most recent effects of the COVID-19 
pandemic, the global spread of the coronavirus and its severe social and economic 
consequences. Throughout the world (though to very different extent – see the International 
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Monetary Fund’s COVID policy tracker9) governments have enacted heavy lockdown 
strategies to slowdown the spread of the virus and introduced stimulus packages to 
minimalize the economic consequences. The role of the state has increased dramatically 
ranging from controlling social life to helping out some specific (strategic) sectors and 
providing social assistance to the most vulnerable groups. Though we consider this return 
of the interventionist state mostly as crisis-driven and anticyclical, it is yet to early to 
draw any conclusions regarding their longer-term impacts. However, it is almost a 
commonplace to claim, that every crisis offers an opportunity, and the COVID-19 might 
have a longer lasting impact on the spreading use of IT-based solutions, resulting in the 
wider spread of distance working, learning (and to some extent even in medical or other 
services). All these changes might change the social and political setup (while the 
composition of winners and losers both in terms of social strata and economic sectors 
might differ from country to country), leading also to changes in the social and 
developmental agendas of states with developmentalist aspirations. 
Finally, we sum up by arguing that in the eve of the third decade of the 21st century, 
we are confronted with an ever-changing global context providing new circumstances 
for statist experiments. Even in the post-2000 period substantial changes have taken 
place, which would require to differentiate between the period before and after the 
GFC, or probably to tackle the post 2014/16 (or even post-COVID) period separately. 
To provide one example, as long as the “new normal” in the world economy in the 
early 2000s (the so called short Golden decade) has meant relatively high economic 
growth rates in emerging economies mainly driven by the commodity boom (the rising 
demand for and increasing prices of primary products), which boosted export 
performance and incoming FDI. In the more recent 5-6 years in contrast the „post-new 
normal” has meant sharply declining commodity prices – stabilizing at relatively low 
levels –, accompanied by the slowdown of the Chinese economy and one of the lowest 
interest rates ever recorded. All these represent a totally new external context for all 
actors in the world economy, including the less developed and emerging economies.
A New Analytical Structure for Developmental States in the Twenty-first Century
In economic historical scale we can date the most recent generation in developmental 
state experiments back to the Millennium, however following the global financial 
crisis in 2008-9 we can observe a so-called renaissance of the developmental state 
literature. The most recent works on DS tend to build on the intellectual traditions of 
the classic DS literature, however also deviate from it in several ways (such as in its 
geographical focus, or in combining the institutional and economic policy approach). 
It is out of the scope of this paper to provide an exhausting analysis of the recent DS 
literature (for this see Fine et al., 2013; Haggard, 2019; Routley, 2014; Wade, 2014; 
9 https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19
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Williams 2014), instead based upon the recent works, we aim to draw up a new 
analytical framework, that can structure the thinking on developmental states and 
related academic debates in the twenty-first century. For identifying main levels of 
this new structure we rely on the development regime (DR) theory elaborated originally 
by Pempel (1998; 1999), and then applied by Wylde (2012) on Latin America, and in 
a somewhat modified version by Booth (2015a; 2015b) on current African developmental 
experiments. The new developmental regime approach can be structured around three 
levels as indicated in the following table. 
Table 1
Analytical Levels of the New Developmental Regime Concept
Pempel [1998; 1999] Booth [2015a; 2015b] 
1. socio-economic alliances 1. political settlements
2. political, economic institutions 2. process of policy making
3. profile of public policies 3. content of relevant public policies
Source. Own construction based on Pempel (1998; 1999) and Booth (2015a; 2015b)
At the highest level of analysis lie the socio-economic alliances that represent the 
main legitimacy base for any developmental regime, and emerge as a result of the 
interactions between the main state institutions, the society and economic sectors. 
Socio-economic alliances are most often structured around some main commonly 
agreed basic principles (such as the development-oriented approach and the consensus 
regarding the central role of state in development), that also influence the public policy 
profile and vice versa. At the same time a DR can also be based on a narrowly or more 
widely defined legitimacy base, such as the voting power of the working class, or the 
power of the police, or the confidence of the capitalist class, or any different combination 
of these (Pempel, 1999, p. 156). 
Booth (2015a, p. 33) speaks of political settlements (or often also referred to as elite 
bargain or consensus), a tacit agreement among the most powerful members of the 
society, the so-called national elites, often having competing interests. Political settlements 
are influenced beside formal institutions by non-institutional factors, such as the 
distribution of political power among main groups of the national elite, and the informal 
procedures of their conflict-resolution, negotiations and compromise-searching and 
building. The original interpretation of political settlements is however even wider, and 
goes back to Khan (1995; 2010), who has analyzed the distribution and balance of power 
between social groups and classes, so the original concept went beyond the competition 
between the elite groups, and took into consideration also the bargaining process between 
the elite and non-elite parts of the society, as well as the within groups’ rivalry. 
The next level of the analytical structure consists of the political and economic 
institutions that are – according to the new institutional school and Douglass North 
(1991) – those formal and informal rules originating from the society and influencing 
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the interactions of the society and politics (Pempel, 1998, p. 30). Booth (2015a) in 
contrast highlights the quality of the policy-making process, as he argues that formal 
and informal rules have not to be regarded in their own, but looking at their results 
and the “hows” of the policy-making process. According to Booth (2015b) those 
political processes have to be analyzed, that lead to the focusing on urging problems 
and the resulting policy choices. The institutionalization of development-oriented 
policies is of key significance for a developmental regime to survive on the medium 
term (and thus overarching political cycles). 
On the third level of the tripod structure is the content (development bias) of relevant 
economic policies that by definitions have to provide certain benefits for the supporters 
of the regime. The development-oriented approach appears in the emphasis and bias 
of public policies, and also in their interrelations. At the same time the resulting 
economic policy mix sustains, strengthens or shapes dominant socio-economic power 
relations as well as the complexity of political and economic institutions (Pempel, 
1998, p. 21). 
The presented three levels of the analytical structure of new DS are strongly 
interrelated and their institutionalization is not only vital for the continuity of the 
regime, but also because this embodies the development-oriented approach in their 
every-day interactions. We also argue that the new developmentalist approach can be 
paralleled with the argumentation of the new political economic and institutional 
analysis, claiming that the main driving force behind long term socio-economic 
development is the mutually complementary system of appropriate formal and informal 
institutions and supporting policies. The widely defined formal and informal institutions, 
social order and habits shape (formal or tacit) political agreements that determine the 
possibilities of countries, shape the quality of the policy-making process, and contribute 
to the resulting public policy mix. 
Finally, the term developmental regime is here used to explicitly distinguish today’s 
development-oriented approach on the one hand from that of the classic developmental 
states with a very long-term time horizon (which were evaluated and labelled as DS 
ex post, in the perspective of 20-30, not rarely 50 years). On the other hand, the term 
developmental regime is also verified with the current aim to go beyond the very 
short-term perspective of strong (charismatic or hard-handed) leaders, development-
oriented governments not overarching political cycles. Thus, the developmental regime 
theory aims to serve as a concept applicable on the medium term, in a time perspective 
of 5-15 years. In our paper however we will use the terms developmental state and 
developmental regime interchangeably, and always note whether we refer to the classic 
paradigm of DS or the new approach of DR. 
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Towards a New Developmental State Concept
Main elements of the new DS concept of the twenty-first century are mostly 
compared to the classic DS paradigm that serves as base of reference to reveal most 
important continuities and changes while drawing up the main cornerstones of the 
new DS concept. The starting point remains the new paradigm in development 
economics, the development as freedom approach and the most recent structural change 
of the economy (the knowledge economy gaining weight) resulting that expanding 
human choices and capabilities becomes primary goal and mean of development. 
Accordingly, new developmental states have to prioritize socially (sustainable) 
equitable and inclusive development. Successful “to-be-developmental states” have 
to dispose of a well formulated and articulated developmental vision that according 
to Mazzucato (2013) goes beyond the commitment to development-oriented approach 
and consists of given (potentially even sectoral) priorities. This developmental agenda 
is however in an ideal case determined with the inclusion and consensus of diverse 
social and economic actors (interest groups), so as to enable social support and 
mobilization for its implementation. 
Political Settlements and Socio-economic Alliances 
In Khan’s (2010) interpretation the main characteristic of development-oriented 
political settlements is that it decreases the political pressure on the acting governments 
to patronize certain interest groups and to apply a short-term view (for a more detailed 
theoretical explanation see Booth [2015b, p. 34], for recent tendencies of economic 
patriotism see Mihályi and Szanyi [2019]). One of the main specificities of developmental 
states is thus, that by building up balanced socio-economic alliances, these can lessen 
the role and share of discretionally distributed rents for buying the support, loyalty of 
certain elite or interest groups and at the same time make it possible for governments 
to apply a long-term development-oriented approach and implement their long term 
developmental vision.10 
Pempel (1999, p. 158) argues that all (post-)modern developmental regimes have 
to consist of the following key characteristics if it wishes to actively and successfully 
promote economic and social development: 1. it has to support the creation of a socio-
economic coalition that is stronger (in terms of disposing or owning more politically 
relevant resources) than any other coalition of the opposition; 2. it has to be able to 
set main priorities in politics and thus put forward a national development agenda; 3. 
it has to be able to articulate a legitimate ideology that implicitly presents the interest 
10 With Olson’s words (1993; 2000) this means that political settlements and alliances are needed in a way that 
supports the transformation from roving bandits focusing on short term profit maximizing towards statio-
nary bandits taking into account longer term aspects. In the classic DS literature Evans (1989) emphasized 
the institutionalized relations to the economic elite and the meritocratic bureaucracy, as these are central to 
prevent the state from becoming predatory. 
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of its supporters as the nation’s common interest;4. it must be able to reward its 
supporters with sufficient benefits, in order to secure the sustainability of their support 
and thus of the regime itself. 
Mazzucato (2013) even goes further when she argues that only a developmental 
(entrepreneurial) state having a clear and well-determined (and well-articulated) 
developmental vision, can be an equal partner to the private sector, and thus only such 
a self-confident state can avoid being captured by certain interest groups. While 
Mazzucato writes about more advanced countries, it is still an open question how this 
applies to the peripheral countries, where state capabilities and capacities are limited 
(Weiss & Thurbon, 2020).
In the new DS approach the main difference compared to the classic paradigm lies 
in the inclusion of wider sectors of the society (such as new relations with the labor 
class, that used to be repressed by the old DS). It explicitly aims to build new networks 
of state and society that are based on social participation, deliberation and consensus 
and at the same time cover wide parts of the society (a so called new – inclusive – 
social contract). Wylde (2012, p. 81) highlights that this new DR approach differs 
significantly from the classic DS theories, as these latter ones were mainly focusing 
on the relations between the state and the industrial capitalist class (see for example 
Evans’ (1995) embedded autonomy theory). For building up a new legitimacy base 
for the twenty-first century’s developmental regimes much wider segments of the 
society must be included. This means a much more complicated task for the new 
development-oriented governments (compared to their old parties), however most 
groups of the society share the common interest of expanding human choices and 
capabilities, the only task is to raise the public awareness on these issues and build up 
support for related investment decisions (Evans, 2014, p. 234).
The Process of Policy Making
In most recent developmental state literature consensus seems to emerge that the 
only lesson to draw from successful development-oriented experiments regarding the 
process of policy making is the primacy of pragmatic, problem-driven and iterative 
approach. 
By pragmatism we mean here, that successful East-Asian countries did not aim to 
implement any grand(iose) plan, but political leaders and technocrats of the bureaucracy 
searched for the best adequate answers for most pressing problems, while relying on 
the trial and error principle and going through a learning-by-doing process (Amsden, 
1989; Doner, Ritchie, & Schneider, 2005; Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990). 
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Building on experiences of developing and emerging countries Andrews et al. (2013) 
highlight this problem-driven and iterative learning process as the key factor lying 
behind their good policy choices and adequate institutional architecture. In this vein 
they emphasize that the common characteristic regarding the process of policy making 
for “to-be-developmental states” is the problem-driven iterative adaptation (PDIA) 
process. Thus, in the area of policy making the one-size-fits-all approach is not 
applicable, and while learning from other’s development successes and failures, one 
has to search for own solutions in the light of the given (and perceived) pressing 
problems and unique context. 
Similar consequences are formulated by Fosu (2013b, p. 7) building on the 
experiences of 18 developing countries, when he and his co-authors argue that both 
orthodox and heterodox policies might be successful depending on the specific 
circumstances. Accordingly, the main difference between successful and less successful 
countries can be drawn back to the application of pragmatic approach to economic 
reforms, the nature of reforms and the capability of countries to take advantage of 
market forces. At the same time there lies a main difference while choosing between 
orthodox or heterodox policies, the latter one namely builds on a much broader set of 
active state interventions, and thus requires a much more capable government with a 
much higher quality public bureaucracy (see for example the classic cases of East-
Asian developmental states). 
In the capability approach to development the only way to determine social and 
economic development objectives is the democratic reconciliation process. As among 
the human capabilities one of the most important is the capability to making choices, 
the process of participation is not only a “mean”, but also an “end” of development 
in itself (Sen, 1999, p. 291). At the same time according to the argumentation of Rodrik 
(2000, p. 19) participatory political institutions have to be regarded as intermediary 
institutions that help to elicit and aggregate local knowledge and thus result in an 
institutional learning process through which it might become more effective to build 
and operate better institutions of other types as well (see also Evans, 2014, p. 234). 
Development-oriented Bias of Public Policies 
Even though development strategies are environment-specific, and are valid within 
time and space constraints, thus as a rule these cannot be emulated (without adaptation) 
under different circumstances, still we argue in line with Fosu (2013a; 2013b) that on 
the level of economic policies there are sufficient commonalities across countries that 
are successful in one or other dimension of development regarding some components 
of success to articulate some guiding principles for other, less successful, countries 
that share some similar characteristics. Looking also at a wider range of the academic 
literature (related to development economics or the middle-income trap, see Doner-
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Schneider, 2016) there seems to emerge a certain package of economic policies that 
can be considered as a general compass if applied flexible enough, adapted to the local 
conditions and circumstances.
Social Policies and Upgrading Human Capabilities
Both the capability approach to development and the most recent restructuring of 
the economy result in the appreciation of the role of human capabilities, as these 
become the main driving forces behind development in the twenty-first century. 
Accordingly, investments in upgrading human resources and investments in legal (and 
physical) infrastructure providing access to information and knowledge gain central 
importance in development policies and strategies. 
Investments in expanding human capabilities tend to remain below the socially 
optimal level due to the market logic (due to the difference between social and private 
returns, higher risk and longer return period). With Evans’ (2014, p. 230) words: Public 
investment is the only plausible route to optimal levels of investment in human 
capabilities. Thus we cite his argumentation as one of the most important raison d’etre 
of the twenty-first century’s developmental state. 
The provision of services aiming at expanding human capabilities (such as education 
and health) are traditionally considered as central tasks of any (not development-
oriented) state, according to the new approach however the effective delivery of 
capability-expanding services and investments has to be carried out aggressively (by 
strong public institutions), and shall be placed at the top of the growth (development) 
strategy (Evans, 2014; Mazzucato, 2013), while the public awareness on its immediate 
distributional and welfare effects has to be raised significantly (Evans, 2014, p. 231). 
Socially the only sustainable development path in the twenty-first century is the 
accomplishment of an equitable, inclusive and long-term development agenda, not 
least to effectively mobilize the majority of the society in favor of the development 
objectives and to build up a legitimacy base for the development-oriented approach. 
At the same time according to the wide definition of social policies and the productive 
inclusion approach (or as Mkandawire [2007]) calls it the transformative social policies) 
special emphasis should be based on economic incentives that facilitate the poor 
households to leave the self-sufficiency sector and to be able to productively get 
involved in the market-based economic sector.11
11 See for example the works of Banerjee and Duflo (2011) on the economic lives of the poor or the most re-
cent magnum opus of Ravallion (2016) with the title the economics of poverty. While the new development 
economics textbook written by Cornia (2020) presents also this new approach to pro-poor and pro-growth 
strategies.
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Infrastructural Investments and Industrial Policies
In the case of developing countries besides the need for human capital development, 
other infrastructural bottlenecks also often pose important constraints to development. 
At the same time private actors can often capture the returns of public investment, and 
the best example for this is exactly the case of the relatively mobile human capital.12 
To avoid this risk a solution might be to improve the complementary business 
environment (via increased public investments) which in turn might increase the derived 
demand for human capital. According to this logic Fosu (2013b) sheds light on the 
importance of the balance between human and other, more traditional (such as physical, 
economic and legal) infrastructural investments in order to improve business 
environment and thus to provide incentives for the better equipped to stay. An 
appropriate balance13 of different (human, economic, institutional and physical) 
infrastructural investments might not just decrease the exit-incentives for human capital, 
but often also acts as magnet to attract or maintain foreign direct investment (FDI), 
and in an ideal case might lead to the diversification of economic activities and 
technological development. 
In the case of the twentieth century developmental states (at least in their classic 
interpretation) industrial policy played a central role. In the most recent developmentalist 
approach industrial policy has come back to the development agenda, however in the 
light of the reviewed literature14 it is easy to see that this renaissance of industrial 
policy goes hand in hand with the emergence of a wider defined science, technological 
and innovation (STI) policy. At the same time, it is worth to note that in most cases 
the classic DS have not only financed investments of location and equipment (physical 
infrastructure), but they also facilitated the access of local companies to information, 
knowledge and technologies, and the creation of networks, while also encouraged the 
companies to move towards economic activities that create new knowledge (thus to 
gradually move up the value chain).15 
Regarding their industrial structure developing countries in today’s technology 
induced global economy cannot flourish without a knowledge-based development 
strategy, though certainly different focal points are needed in the case of a predominantly 
12 To illustrate this one only has to refer to the classic work of Hirschman (1970) on the “exit options” of hu-
man capital. 
13 See for example Kimura’s (2013) new interpretation of the Japanese development success. He argues that 
though social infrastructural expenditures did play an important role, their share remained below 30% of the 
total infrastructural expenditure, and economic infrastructural investments played comparatively a larger 
role. 
14 See eg. Fine et al. (2013), Mazzucato (2013), Szalavetz (2015), Wade (2014) and the special issue on the Re-
birth of Industrial Policies in the Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade edited by Aiginger and Rodrik 
(2020).
15 Evans (2014, p. 232) mentions China as a typical example where the state resisted to overprotect the mono-
polized ideas of the (mainly northern and more developed) corporations and thus “supported” the access to 
productive ideas of its citizens and companies.
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agrarian backward economy, as in the case of an industrialized middle-income country. 
An important consequence of the new technologies and the most recent economic 
structural change is that today certain stages of industrial modernization can be 
leapfrogged.16 At the same time according to Wade (2014, p. 781) price changes on 
the market facilitate gradual, step-by-step development, and thus these might impede 
in the case of innovations and economic diversification larger changes. To make these 
changes possible active state interventions are needed, and this is the second argument 
in favour of the raison d’etre of the twenty-first century’s developmental state.
This “old-new”17 industrial policy role of governments is still subject to heavy 
academic debates in economics. Authors of the modern DS literature mostly argue for 
a pro-active, entrepreneurial state and mostly oppose the conventional mainstream 
view, which has a much more sector-neutral stand, and stands for the improvement of 
the general business environment and institutional infrastructure to attract productive 
private capital and to decrease the risk of out-migration of the (state-financed) human 
capital. In contrast to these mainstream views the “industrialists” argue that in the 
times of knowledge economy the state has to undertake active industrial policy 
interventions to promote job creation and risky innovative activities that are not 
performed by the private sector (Aiginger & Rodrik, 2020; Mazzucato, 2013; Wade, 
2014). In their logic the state has to go beyond the (long term, committed “patient”) 
financing of basic and applied research (activities that are even admitted and highlighted 
by mainstream economists). 
Financing Development
Financing development used to be a neuralgic point in classic developmental state 
literature. As long as in the case of the classic Northeast-Asian DS a very specific and 
unique context (financial development aid form the US and Japan, traditionally high 
domestic saving rates, relatively closed economic systems, and repressed domestic 
financial markets) contributed to the financial viability of a national development 
model, the financial difficulties (not least signaled by the debt crisis of the 1980s) of 
the developmentalist experiments of the Latin American counterparts in the last century 
provide the antithesis. 
Taking into account the current stage of financial globalization and most recent 
experiences of global financial (and economic) crises, we can state the DS in the 
twenty-first century has a much narrower room for maneuver to finance their (much 
broader) economic growth (development) agenda, as did their classic antecedents in 
16 Thus, in this regard the classic stages approach of Balassa (1981) is outdated. 
17 Mazzucato (2013, p. 21) argues that these are not new industrial policy interventions, but have happened 
already back in time, and describes how the state of the US has played a central role in developing new 
technologies, supporting new industries, but did this in a hidden way. Similarly, Szalavetz (2015) writes, that 
industrial policies after the 2008-9 crisis are not new, but old industrial policy practices have been revived. 
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the middle of the last century. In our financially globalized world economy securing 
macroeconomic stability becomes central, as a solid macroeconomic position might 
build up good business confidence and thus encourage investors and attract FDI. 
Though in the short run and only temporarily today’s developing countries also might 
rely on external sources (besides FDI, foreign aid and credit) during the implementation 
of their development strategies, on the longer run a more balanced development budget 
is needed, and the role of domestic resources cannot be overrated. Incentives for 
domestic savings, rationalization of government expenditures, the system of national 
taxes as well as the government’s abilities to collect those taxes become central issues 
to development. 
Outward Orientation
By the twenty-first century it became clearly evident that outward oriented 
development strategies are superior to any other nationalistic and delinking economic 
strategies. Experiences of the classic (Northeast-Asian) developmental states have 
also proved the benefits of an outward-oriented development strategy for long term 
economic growth and development. In the classic cases export-orientation has implicitly 
presumed that bureaucratic guidelines have been in line with the international market 
forces (Amsden, 1989; Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1990). Thus, taking into account and 
relying on international market incentives was at the heart of the classic DS model. 
In the twenty-first century however, we have to go beyond the articulation of the 
outward oriented economic strategy and in order to achieve export-driven economic 
growth the role of domestic institutions, and their upgrading is inevitable. With Fosu’s 
(2013a, p. 11) words outward orientation has to go hand in hand with increasing 
competition in the domestic market and with building domestic institutional capabilities 
(improving macroeconomic stability and strengthening institutional and human 
infrastructures). In light of the most recent global financial and economic crises 
economic diversification (not only in terms of export products but also in export 
markets) is not only crucial for long term economic growth, but plays an important 
role for securing economic stability (or with other words for decreasing economic 
vulnerability). Outward orientation (and economic diversification) plays a 
complementary role to (and does not substitute for) the development of the domestic 
market. Most recent experiences of successful large emerging markets (such as China) 
underline the need for this complementary approach, while some less successful cases 
(such as Brazil) provide a cautionary tale. 
Public Sector Reform
Social changes of the twentieth century, globalization and the following changes 
in domestic politics have led to the appreciation of the role of the capabilities and 
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capacities of political institutions to effectively define developmental goals. This not 
only presumes a new type, bottom up relationship between the state and society, but 
also highlights the role of spreading, collecting, and processing information, and also 
appreciates the capabilities and capacities of the public sector to fulfil with these new 
tasks (Evans, 2014, p. 222). The meritocratic, well-educated, competent, well-paid 
and from political power relatively insulated (but still embedded) bureaucracy was a 
central element of the classic paradigm of DS. In the new DS approach however not 
only technocratic qualities are needed, but also other, more political qualities are 
inevitable on the one hand to collect, screen and process information in the knowledge 
economy and society, and on the other hand also to define collective objectives on a 
participatory and consultative manner and to reorganize the relations with the business 
and civil sector. 
At the same time Carroll and Jarvis (2017) plausibly argue, that in the current 
economic dynamics paved by the globalized world economy and late capitalist 
production gains for certain interest groups (such as the most competitive fractions of 
domestic and transnational capital) by far outweigh the rewards for less fortunate 
actors (the less competitive fractions of capital and labor), and this poses important 
challenges regarding the classic (idealized) relations of state and capital as known 
from the classic developmental state models – called embedded autonomy by Evans 
(1995). The above-mentioned authors thus call for disembedding the autonomy of 
public bureaucracies (and in wider terms developmental institutions) to reconfigure 
and reconstitute developmental states in the twenty-first century (see also Chu, 2019).
Finally, we wish to emphasize once again, that all these mentioned elements have 
to be regarded as a complex, as a policy mix, and just by picking one or the other will 
not lead to an appropriate result. To be clear we can state for example regarding the 
last mentioned factor, capable and coherent bureaucracy is necessary but not sufficient 
for building successful developmental states in the twenty-first century. In this vein 
we sum up by arguing that a special economic policy mix can be outlined for constructing 
a new developmentalist agenda in the twenty-first century, and this at least contains 
investments into the expansion of human capabilities, the widely defined transformative 
social policies (incl. investments into education and health services and labor market 
reforms), and public sector reforms as well as stable macroeconomic management and 
industrial (including STI) policies, but also extends to trade and tax issues. 
Concluding Remarks
The paper has proposed a new analytical structure to investigate new developmental 
state experiments of the twenty-first century. While accepting that economic policies 
are at the heart of any developmentalist project (as these basically determine the 
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relations of state and society, state and the market, and last but not least the relation 
of the state with the rest of the world), we have also highlighted that economic policies 
come to work through the given economic and political institutions, which are in turn 
determined by the political power structure and the resulting political settlements and 
socio-economic alliances. Accordingly, developmental states in the twenty-first century 
should be analyzed in a tripod structure, as this comprehensive approach might 
contribute to the extension of the relevance of the new DS concept (both regarding its 
content, timing and geographical scope). 
To sum up, we highlight the main characteristics of the new DS approach compared 
to the classic paradigm along the above explained dichotomies18, and argue in line 
with Pempel (1999) and Wylde (2012) that there is a need to go beyond the tripod 
alliance of national governments, the domestic and the international capital, that has 
characterized the analysis of classic developmental states.
Regarding the state and the market dichotomy, the developmentalist approach 
assuming the active and positive role of the state in development represents the main 
continuity between the old and new DS approach. This is manifested for example in 
the significance of macroeconomic stability and stable investment environment, the 
market- and competition-friendly approach, as well as the more contentious issue of 
active (and selective) industrial policies. One of the main historical lesson of classic 
developmental state experiences is, that the power of the state to discipline big 
businesses was strong (at least initially), and in exchange for generous state support, 
international competitiveness was expected as “each regime has operated with an eye 
toward world market” (Pempel 1999, p. 173). Thus, state interventions have reinforced 
market principles, at least in their international dimensions. 
The relation between the state and society has been undoubtedly and fundamentally 
changed: while the old, classic DS have achieved their economic success along the 
repression and political exclusion of wide segments (the majority) of their societies, 
in the case of twenty-first century’s DS the state-society relations should be based on 
more equitable, inclusive and participatory processes. The new approach builds upon 
the inclusion of the needs and interests of diverse social groups into domestic politics 
and prefers policy responsiveness and a balanced approach to these very diverse social 
needs. The formation of new socio-economic alliances is however shaped by the 
political institutional architecture, the distribution of political power and the bargain 
mechanisms. These differ however not only from the classic solutions of the old DS 
of the last century, but most recent developmentalist experiments show also wide-
ranging possibilities and diverse patterns (Kurlantzick, 2016).
18 Such as relations between the state and the society; the state and the market; the state and the rest of the 
world.
Ricz / Developmental States in the Twenty-First Century: New Wine into Old Bottles?
669
Last but not least regarding the relations between the state and the rest of the world 
in the era of advanced economic (and financial) globalization, outward orientation 
(export diversification both in products and markets) has to be placed on a new footing 
(reforms of domestic institutions), and the effectiveness of resource allocation has to 
occupy a central place in any development-oriented model. As long as in the golden 
age of DS during the mid of the last century nationalistic and nation-based development 
strategies were viable and most successful East-Asian developmental states were 
connected to the world economy mainly through the trade of goods (and their export-
oriented economic strategies), today outward oriented strategies are much more 
complex. Taking into account international processes and changes in the twenty-first 
century is inevitable as these shapes those (changing) development opportunities and 
constraints that determine the political (and economic) room for maneuver for modern 
states with developmentalist aspirations. 
We have presented that the new DS approach reflecting the new challenges of the 
twenty-first century should be fundamentally a market-friendly approach19, in which 
however the state has an active (but compared to the classic theories) re-defined and 
revisited role in promoting widely defined development. At the same time ‘to-be-
developmental states’ have to build upon the developmental experiences (of both the 
more and less advanced countries) of the last century (Fosu, 2013a, 2013b), while 
going beyond their late development context. One has to break away with the 
geographical focus on East Asia (Booth, 2015a, 2015b), but at the same time to remain 
relevant for the special cases of the catching up economies of the global South. In 
short for a new DS approach both the territorial and the thematic focus of the original 
DS paradigm has to be widened. 
While presenting some elements of the new DS approach we have argued that on 
the one hand on the levels of public policies and the policy-making process some kind 
of convergence can be captured looking at the developments successes (at least 
regarding some components or dimensions of development) in the past or currently. 
On the other hand on the level of political (and economic) institutional settings diversity 
prevails and seems to flourish even in the twenty-first century. 
The presented new DS approach is however much less a practical reality, and much 
more an opportunity, too often overlooked or misinterpreted by current governments. 
This new approach to state-led developmentalism not only presumes technical capacities 
and proficiency (as was the case by the old DS), but also presumes the methods to 
define normative and political objectives, and thus the proactive promotion of 
development in the twenty-first century becomes more than a ‘simple’ technical 
problem of economic growth, it becomes a central issue in domestic politics.
19 We can also call it “developmental capitalism” with the words of Bresser Pereira (2016).
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